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I. INTRODUCTION 
The public outcry following dog-fighting charges brought against the now-
infamous NFL star Michael Vick has recently brought the Jaws concerning animals 
into the spotlight. 1 While legally treated as property,2 animals are categorically 
distinct from other property, as they are able to feel pain and form emotional bonds 
with other animals, including human beings. 3 Animals, therefore, need special 
protections in addition to those afforded to all types of property.4 
Largely due to a growing public concern regarding the treatment of animals, laws 
directed at protecting animals have been passed at both the federal and state levels.' 
However, many of these laws prove inadequate in practice due to their many 
restrictions, piecemeal enactment, and a lack of enforcement. Furthermore, litigation 
under them is difficult because of the existence of a standing barrier: animals, as 
property, do not have standing to tile suit on their own behalf, and people often are 
not able to tile suit on behalf of the animals needing protection. 6 Many people 
attempting to further the rights and protections of animals try using past judicial 
decisions to better formulate arguments that will allow courts to find that they have 
standing to sue, thereby permitting access to the proper forum to challenge violations 
of the "rights" of animals. However, until the court system completes a considerable 
transformation regarding its view of animals as property, adequate protection of 
animals will only occur upon the passage and enforcement of improved animal 
welfare laws. 
This Note examines the current status and inadequacies of laws concerning 
animals, the standing barrier, and the consequent need for new legislation. Part II 
provides a brief overview of the legal treatment of animals in the United States. Part 
III discusses the background of standing and difficulties facing those attempting to 
1Clifton Brown, Dogfighting Charges Filed Against Falcons· Vick, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 
2007, at D I, available at http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2007 /07/18/sports/football/18vick.html. 
2LISA YOUNT, ANIMAL RIGHTS 9 (2004); Lauren Magnotti, Note, Pawing Open the 
Courthouse Door: Why Animals' Interests Should Matter When Courts Grant Standing, 80 Sr. 
JOHN'S L. REV. 455,455,457 (2006). 
3Magnotti, supra note 2, at 457-58. 
4/d. 
5See Animal Welfare Act of 1970, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2156 (2008); Marine Mammal 
Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S. C. §§ 1361-1421 h (2008); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 
U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 945.01 (West 2008); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 44-17-403 (West 2007). See genera/t-v Magnotti, supra note 2 (arguing for greater 
consideration of animals' interests in the legal realm). 
6Magnotti, supra note 2, at 455-56. See generallv Animal Legal Def Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 
23 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding animal welfare groups and individuals did not have 
standing to sue to expand the definition of"animals" to include birds. rats. and mice); Animal 
Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding farmers, animal 
organizations, and husbandry groups did not have standing to sue for injunction against animal 
patents); lnt'l Primate Prot. League v. lnst. for Behavioral Research, Inc., 799 F.2d 934 (4th 
Cir. 1986) (holding individuals and animal rights organizations lacked standing to sue for 
guardianship of primates used in research after chief of research found guilty of cruelty to 
animals). 
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bring cases in federal and state courts because of a lack of standing to sue. Part IV 
discusses the reasons for the court system's reluctance to hear cases involving 
animals, thus emphasizing the need for new legislation to deal with such matters 
outside of the courtroom. Part V discusses the problems with current animal 
protection legislation and suggests that better legislation is necessary to eliminate 
those problems through a restructuring of statutory language and enforcement 
mechanisms. Part VI provides a sample of possible new, comprehensive legislation 
that is applicable in any situation requiring protection for animals. 
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF ANIMALS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
The status of animals throughout the history of American Jaw is fairly static. 
When assigning legal rights in 1787, the framers of the U.S. Constitution did not 
confer any rights onto those creatures born with four, six. or even zero, legs. 7 In the 
eyes of the law. animals were and still are nothing more than property, with no legal 
rights of their own. x 
Because animals are technically private property, many believe the government 
should not infringe on the rights of the property owners to use their property as they 
see fit. 9 Historically, the legal system has supported the right of individuals to own 
and use private property as they wish. 10 Laws regulating the use of one's own 
animals may be considered a violation of an individual's right to use one's property 
for his or her benefit. 11 This view has allowed the law to maintain animal owners' 
rights to exploit their animals for science, agriculture, entertainment, fashion, and to 
have "free reign to dispose of their own property as they wish, including killing an 
animal without neccssity." 12 
Others believe that the designation of animals as property is incorrect and 
therefore laws made under this view are inadequate. 13 Those who would not classify 
animals as property argue that "[p ]roperty, in general, is inanimate. Animals are 
sentient. Therefore, putting animals in the same category as inanimate possessions 
7 See U.S. CoNST. ( 1787). 
xYOUNT, supra note 2. 
9Joanne M. Pyc, Changing the Animal Legal Paradigm Using the United States Tax Code. 
30 CAP. U. L. REV. 947, 955 (2002). 
10 Panel, The Legal Status ofNonhuman Animals, 8 ANIMAL L. I, 50 (2002). 
11 Carole Lynn Nowicki, The Animal Welfare Act: All Bark and No Bite, 23 SETON HALL 
LEms. J. 443,447-51 (1999). 
12/d. at 448-49. Another problem with this view is that many believe that, because people 
value their own property, laws are not necessary to protect animals. /d. at 448. 
[T]he law assumes that people will protect the value of their own property by not 
ham1ing it. This incorporates the assumption that self-interest will prevent an owner 
from causing pain or torture to her animals unless there is a good reason for doing so. 
As a result, anti-cruelty statutes only minimally regulate the behavior of animal 
owners. 
!d. at 448-49. 
13 Pyc, supra note 9, at 956. 
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does not make sense." 14 Additionally, animals have been found to have many traits 
similar to humans that are not shared with other property, such as the ability to feel 
physical pain and exhibit certain emotions. 15 Although animal activists have been 
able to distinguish animals from other types of property, "courts continue to uphold 
this property characterization." 16 
This perception of animals as property proves a difficult hurdle in finding 
balance between competing human and animal interests. 17 Humans generally protect 
the interests of animals only where such protection proves necessary to ensure 
maximum exploitation of their "investment" (i.e. the anima1). 1' "Institutionalized 
animal exploitation is permitted because society has determined that economic 
efficiency outweighs the inhumanity of an animal's suffering or death. Thus, only 
activities without any social benefit are prohibited by statute." 19 Unfortunately for 
14/d. 
15 Elizabeth L. DeCoux, In the Valley of the Dry Bones: Reuniting the Word ''Standing"' 
with its Meaning in Animal Cases, 29 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & Pm'y REV. 681,713 (2005). 
See also Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Glickman. !54 F.3d 426, 428 ( 1998) (referencing an 
"appropriatt: plan tor environment o:nhancement adequate to promote the psychological well-
being of nonhuman primates"). "Scientitic research has provided a [great] wealth of 
understanding to us that we cannot rightly ignore. We now know that mammals share with us 
a great many emotive and cognitive characteristics, and that the higher primates are very 
similar to humans neurologically and genetically." Thomas G. Kelch, Tmmrd a Non-Property 
Status/in· Animals. 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 531, 539 ( 1998 ). 
16Nowicki, supra note II, at 447. 
17Gary L. Francione, Reflections on Animals. Propertv, and the Law, and Rain Without 
Thunder, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PRUHS. 9, 9 (2007). 
1 
'I d. Gary L. Francione statt:s that pt:oplc: 
[M]ay as a matter of personal choice attach a higher value to our companion animals, 
such as dogs and cats, but as far as the law is concerned, even these animals are 
nothing more than commodities. As a general matter, we do not regard animals as 
having any intrinsic value and we protect animal interests only to the extent that it 
benefits us to do so. 
!d. This "attachment of higher value" to companion animals in no way deters from the 
argument that animals are protected only so far as we see use for them. The higher value 
given to companion animals is merely a means by the owner to secure the prolonged 
exploitation of these animals to fulfill their human interests of needing companionship and 
protection from their pets. 
19Nowicki, supra note I I, at 449-50. An argument that protecting animals and 
discouraging violence against them is heneticial to society stems from the link between 
violence to animals and violence to other people. Kara Gerwin, There's (Almost) No Place 
Like Home: Kansas Remains in the Minoritv on Protecting Animals From Cruelty, !5 KAN. 
J.L. & PUB. Pot'Y 125, 135 (2005). ''[M]ost courts agree ... [that] cruel treatment of animals 
.. lead[ s] to cruel treatment of humans.'' !d. According to Gerwin: 
Children who are violent to animals may be on a path to lifelong violence. Many 
serial killers and mass murderers '"have a long history of abusive acts towards 
animals." Studies have shown that "[a]ggressive acts against animals are an early 
diagnostic indicator of tuture psychopathy, which, if unrecognized and untreated, may 
escalate in range and severity against other victims." 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss1/7
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animals, few activities involving the use of animals have no plausible benefit to 
humans, leaving the door wide open for the legal exploitation of animals to 
continue. 20 
Animals are used by humans for a wide variety of reasons21 ; their use as a source 
of food exemplifies the imbalance between human and animal interests. 22 Because 
of the increasing demand in the highly profitable meat industry, many anti-cruelty 
regulations provide exemptions for common farming practices. 23 According to 
Mariann Sullivan24 and David J. Wolfson 25 : 
Approximately ten billion animals, excluding fish, are killed annually in 
the United States for food. These animals are regularly confined for life 
to very small areas-some no bigger than themselves---virtually unable to 
move a muscle, are mutilated and castrated without anesthesia, are 
handled and slaughtered in inhumane ways, and are genetically 
engineered to increase production in ways that cause them to be ill and 
malformed. This mistreatment goes on, day after day, animal by animal, 
endlessly. 26 
Such treatment is a means to literally feed the people of the United States' 
"tremendous addiction to meat. " 27 An imbalance of interests results because people 
are willing to ignore the "cost" of animal suffering so long as the meat industry 
continues to provide affordable meat. 2R This leaves timn animals at the mercy of the 
!d. Thus, those who go to work day after day, inflicting pain and suffering on defenseless 
animals, may grow immune, or even begin to enjoy, the sutlering they are inflicting, and may 
eventually take their violent behavior outside of the workplace and into society. !d. 
2~owicki, supra note II, at 450. 
21 Melanie L. Vanderau, Science at Any Cost: The Ineffectiveness and Underen('orcement 
of the Animal Welfare Act, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL. L REv. 721, 721 (2006). Animals are also 
used for companionship, labor, scientific research, and entertainment purposes. /d. 
22Jd. See Mariann Sullivan & David J. Wolfson, What's Goodfur the Goose . The 
Israeli Supreme Court, Foie Gras, and the Future of'Farmed Animals in the United States, 70 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 139 (2007). 
23Sullivan & Wolfson, supra note 22, at 154-55. 
24
"Mariann Sullivan is the deputy chief court attorney at the New York State Appellate 
Division, First Department. She is a former chair of the animal law committee of the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York and a member of the animal law committees 
of the New York State Bar Association and the American Bar Association." !d. at 139, n. a I. 
25
"David J_ Wolfson is a corporate partner at Milbank. Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP and 
an adjunct professor at NYU Law School where be teaches animal law. He also teaches 
animal law at Columbia Law School." !d. at 139, n. aal. 
261d. at 139. 
27 The Legal Status of' Nonhuman Animals, supra note 10, at 51. "Humans !arm about 150 
million tons of meat each year." Kelch, supra note 15. at 531. 
28 Ellen P. Goodman, Animal Ethics and the Law, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1291, 1304 (2006) 
(reviewing Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds .. A REVIFW or ANIMAL RIGHTS: 
CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS (2004)). "If we are unhappy knowing that animals 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009
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useless (as this Note will later explain) "protective" statutes, such as the Humane 
Methods of Slaughter Act of 1958.c9 
Even so, over the past few decades society has slowly become more sympathetic 
to animal activists30 seeking to ensure humane treatment for all animals. 31 The law, 
however, has not kept up with such views. Statutes have been passed on both the 
federal and state levels providing regulations for the treatment of animals, but, as this 
Note will illustrate, much of this legislation has proved inadequate.32 In addition to 
the problems with the statutes themselves, "[t]he status of animals as property 
impacts ... standing in animal rights cases."n As property, animals do not have any 
protected rights and therefore cannot claim violation of such rights in a court of 
law. 34 Additionally, "[ s ]ince animals are property and have no rights, representatives 
of animals cannot assert the interests of animals in the judicial system."35 Thus, 
animals are left with no legal recourse to defend themselves against brutal and 
inhumane exploitation.36 
are suffering in factory farms, we have a choice between changing the conditions that cause 
this suf1ering, or ... persuad[ing] people not to worry about animal suffering." !d. 
297 u.s. c. §§ 1901-1906 (2008). 
30While most have a tendency to group "animal rights activists" together with "animal 
welfare activists," each group actually represents two very distinct views. Jacqueline Tresl, 
The Broken Window: Laying Down the LawfiJr Animals, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 277, 278 (2002). 
"1\n animal rights activist believes animals should be granted rights separate and apart from 
humans. By contrast, the animal weltiuist is unconcerned with rights and concerned instead 
that animals not be subjected to unnecessary pain and suffering." /d. Thus, under a welfarist 
view, animals may still be used by humans; many animal rights groups, however, have 
mantras similar to that of People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals: "animals are not ours 
to eat, wear, experiment on, or use for entertainment." !d. 
31 A large number of animal activist groups have emerged in this country, such as the 
Animal Legal Defense Fund, People tor the Ethical Treatment of Animals, and The American 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, exemplifying a growing interest concerning 
the rights and treatment of animals. See Animal Legal Defense Fund, http://www.aldf.org 
(last visited Nov. I, 2008); People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, http://www.peta.org 
(last visited Nov. I, 2008 ); The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 
http://www.aspca.org/site/PageServer (last visited Nov. I, 2008). 
32See Animal Welfare Act of 1970, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2156 (2008); Marine Mammal 
Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S. C. §§ 1361-1421 h (2008); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 
U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 945.01 (West 2008); TENN. CoDE ANN. 
§ 44-17-403 (West 2007). 
33Kelch, supra note 15, at 535. 
'4ld. 
35/d. 
36YOUNT, supra note 2. See generally Magnotti, supra note 2 (discussing the often brutal 
treatment of animals and difficulty getting such cases into court because of their status as 
property). 
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Ill. THE STANDING REQUIREMENT AS A BARRIER TO THE COURTROOM 
A federal or state court will not hear a case without first finding that the plaintiff 
has standing to sue. 37 "Standing" is defined as "[a] party's right to make a legal 
claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right."'s This requirement comes 
from an interpretation of the case or controversy requirement provided in Article III 
of the Constitution, which states, in relevant part, "The judicial Power shall extend to 
all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution [and] the Laws of the 
United States ... [and] to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; 
to Controversies between two or more states ... [and] between Citizens of di f'fcrent 
States."39 Thus, anyone attempting to file suit in a court of law must satisfy the 
judge that he or she has standing to sue. 40 
The purpose of the standing requirement is to ensure that a plaintiff is legally 
warranted to have his or her claim decided in a court of law. 41 A "proper plaintiff' is 
one for whom "the court is resolving an actual concrete controversy: something that 
will be presented in an adversarial way by the parties, something that is capable of 
judicial resolution, not some hypothetical situation."42 The standing requirement 
alleviates a court's duty to hear frivolous and speculative lawsuits.43 Those without 
legitimate controversies will be removed from court, allowing plaintiffs with a legal 
right to a judicial decision access to the system for resolution of his or her claim. 
To establish standing, a plaintiff must, at a mtntmum, fulfill three 
"constitutional" requirements, as well as any additional ''prudential" requirements as 
determined by the court.44 Under the Constitution, standing may exist where a 
plaintiff can show (I) an "injury-in-fact," (2) causation, and (3) redressability. 45 
Each of these "core" constitutional requirements "is an essential and unchanging part 
37See generally Animal Legal Def Fund, Inc. v. Espy. 23 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 
(holding animal welfare groups and individuals did not have standing to sue to expand the 
definition of ·'animals" to include birds, rats, and mice); Animal Legal De f. Fund v. Quigg, 
932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding farmers, animal organizations, and husbandry groups 
did not have standing to sue for injunction against animal patents); lnt'l Primate Prot. League 
v. In st. for Behavioral Research, Inc., 799 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. I n6) (holding individuals and 
animal rights organizations lacked standing to sue for guardianship of primates used in 
research after chief of research found guilty ofcnwlty to animals). 
38 8LACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1442 (8th e(L 2004). "Third-party standing'' is defined as 
"[s]tanding held by someone claiming to protect the rights of others." /d. 
39U.S. CoNST. art. Ill, ~ 2 cl. I. State constitutions also have constitutional standing 
requirements. See. e.g., OHIO CoNS!. art. IV. 
40 /d. See also 8I.ACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,supra note 3R. 
41 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 49R ( 1975). 
42Panel, Confronting Barriers to the Courtroom/in· Animal Advocates: IA!gal Standing fin-
Animals and Advocates, 13 ANIMAL L. 61. 63 (2006 ). 
43/d. 
44Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 50-t U.S. 555,560 ( 1992). 
45 /d. at 560-6 L 
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of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article Ill" that a plaimiff "bears the 
burden of establishing."46 
The first constitutional standing requirement that a plaintiff must establish is that 
the plaintiff has suffered an injury-in-fact. 47 An injury-in-fact occurs when a legally 
protected interest is invaded by the act (or failure to act) of another. 48 In cases 
involving injuries to animals, it is not enough to show that an animal has suffered an 
injury, because animals generally do not have their own legally protected interests.4'1 
Rather, the plaintiff must show he or she has suffered an actual injury or has some 
personal stake in the outcome.50 
Numerous courts have furthered clarified the injury-in-fact requirement. 51 In 
American Society for the Prevention ol Cruel tv to Animals v. Ringling Brothers and 
Barnum & Bailey Circus, 52 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
ruled an injury-in-fact may be found where the "invasion of a judicially cognizable 
interest ... is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent."53 In that 
case the court found an injury-in-fact where a former circus elephant caretaker 
witnessed the mistreatment of his charges. 5• In so finding, the court determined that 
because of his personal emotional attachment to the elephants, the caretaker satisfied 
the prerequisites because he witnessed the alleged mistreatment and had a present 
desire to visit the elephants under humane conditions." Finding these injuries as 
neither hypothetical nor conjectural, the court ruled that the plaintiff suffered an 
injury-in-fact. 56 
461d. at 560 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 ( 1984)). 
47/d. at 560. 
4
xAm. Soc·y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & 
Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334. 336 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
49See genera!!y id (determining whether an elephant trainer and animal rights group had 
standing to sue where elephants had been subjected to inhumane treatment by circus). "Since 
nonhuman animals are property and lack legal personhood, courts view their injuries as 
'tangential' to the true injury-that injury suffered by the person or organization bringing the 
suit." Marguerite Hogan, Comment. Standing fiJr Nonhuman Animals: Developing a 
Guardianship Model from the Dissents in Sierra Club v. Morton, 95 CAL. L. REV. 513, 522 
(2007). 
50
"[T]he injury must atfect the plaintitfin a personal and individual way." Lujan. 504 U.S. 
at 561, n.l. 
51 See generally Ringling Bros .. 317 F.3d 334 (holding a former circus elephant caretaker 
who witnessed the mistreatment of his charges had standing to sue); Animal Legal Def Fund 
v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding regular visitors to primate exhibitions 
had standing when they repeatedly witnessed primates living in inhumane conditions). 
52317 F .3d 334 (D.C. Cir. 2003 ). 
51/d. at 336 (quoting Bennett v. Spear. 520 U.S. 154. 167 (1997)). 
54/d. 
55/d. at 337-38. 
5
"/d. at 336. See also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); 
Alternatives Research & Dev. Found. v. Glickman, 101 F. Supp. 2d 7. 10 (D.D.C. 2000). 
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A plaintiff must next satisfy the "causation" element of constitutional standing. 
This is done by proving "a sufficient causal relationship between the challenged act 
and the alleged injury. A party must show that his injury reasonably can be said to 
have resulted from defendant's alleged statutory infraction."57 Causation does not 
exist where the connection between the plaintiffs injury and the defendant's act is 
merely a speculative inference or is interrupted by an intervening act of a third 
party. 5~ Rather, causation "requires a party to show that 'the injury [is] fairly 
traceable to the challenged action. "'50 
The final constitutional standing requirement is established where a plaintiff can 
show that the issue brought before the court is redressable. A court will find an issue 
redressable when a party shows "'a substantial probability' that, if the court aftords 
the relief requested, his injury will be removed."60 The likelihood of such an 
outcome may not be "merely 'speculative.'"61 If the proposed remedy will not likely 
alleviate the injury suffered by the plaintiff, a court will not find standing to sue.62 
Some courts have established prudential requirements in addition to the 
constitutional standing requirements, such as demanding a plaintiff satisfy the "zone 
of interests" test. 63 This test requires that the plaintiff show "the interest sought to be 
protected by complainant is arguably within the zone of interests [Congress 
intended] to be protected by the statute."64 This does not necessitate a showing that 
the statute in question was created specijicallr for the protection of the plaintiff.''5 
Rather, the plaintiff need only demonstrate a slight indication that the statute was 
created to protect his allegedly violated interest.66 Thus, the zone of interests 
requirement may easily be established when the "proper person," according to the 
court, is filing suit. 67 
57 Animal Welfare Jnst. v. Kreps, 561 F.2d 1002, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
5 ~Sce Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 932-34 (Fed. Cir. 1991 ). 
5'!/d. at 932 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 ( 1984 )). 
6
°Krcp1, :"(,1 F.2d at 1009. 
61 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 56!. 
62 /d. at 568-71. 
63 Animal Legal De f. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 444 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
64/d. (quoting Nat'l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'! Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 
492 ( 1998)). 
65 G!ickman, 154 F .. 1d at 444 (citing Autnlog Corp. v. Regan. 731 F.2d 25,29-30 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) ('"[T]he /One uf interests test ·requires some indicia----however slight--that the 
litigant bd(m~ the court -was intended to be protected, beneiited or regulated by the statute 
under which suit is brought.' Courts should give broad compass to a statute's 'zone of 
interests' in recognition that this test was originally intended to expand the number of litigants 
able to assert their rights in court."). 
66/d. 
67Some consider such prudential requirements as nothing more than a way for judges to 
keep legitimate cases out of court because they personally do not find them worthy of judicial 
decision. Sce Confinnting Barriers to the Courtroom for Animal Advocates: Legal Standing 
for Animals and Advocates, supra note 42 ("[Prudential requirements are] not . 
constitutional rcquirement[s]. but one[sj that courts can apply at their discretion if they want to 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009
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Prudential requirements also may include prohibitions against claims involving 
third party rights and generalized grievances. 6s "To have standing, a party must 
demonstrate an interest that is distinct from the interest held by the public at large."69 
Additionally, a plaintitT "must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot 
rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties."70 Each of these 
additional standing requirements creates a further obstacle for those seeking to 
protect animals; a plaintiff may not base his claim on the harm done to the rights of 
an animal, nor on the general failure of the government to provide adequate 
protection for an animal. 71 
Groups attempting to file suit to prevent the mistreatment of animals are 
subjected to further assessment than are individual plaintiffs.72 Before allowing a 
plaintiff-group's case to proceed, a court will apply a three-part test, requiring the 
group establish that "(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their 
own right"': (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's 
purpose74 ; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the 
participation of individual members in the lawsuit."75 The court may further 
consider the group's duration and activities to determine whether they have the 
"longevity and indicia of commitment to preventing inhumane behavior ... which 
might provide standing to ... better known organizations." 76 Only upon satisfaction 
of all required factors will a court allow a plaintiff-group to proceed with its case. 77 
kick you out of court, even though you have shown that you meet all of the constitutional 
requirements."). 
i•X ABA, !\ BLACKLETTER ST i\TEMFNT OF Fl-llFRAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 48 (2004). A 
generalized grievance is a grievance "held by the public at large," Animal Lovers Volunteer 
Ass 'n \'. Weinhoger, 765 F.2d 937, 939 (9th Cir. 1985). often regarding "the conduct of 
government or the allocation of power in the Federal System," Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 
106(1968). 
h''Weinhcrger, 765 F.2d at 939 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S 727, 736-41 
(1972)). 
70Valley Forge Christian College \. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, 454 
U.S. 464. 474 ( 1982) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 ( 1975)). 
71 See Weinhe1ger. 765 F.2d at 9.18-39 (holding plaintiff animal rights group did not have 
standing to sue where the only injury demonstrated was to goats removed through "aerial 
eradication" by the U.S. Navy). 
72 UA W v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 2iQ-83 ( 19X6). 
71 ln other words, the constitutional and prudential requirements of standing must be 
satis1icd. Sec Lujan v. De lenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 ( 1992). 
7 ' 1''G~:rmane" is delined as "'in close relationship, appropriate, relative, pertinent." Humane 
Soc'y of the United Staks v. HodeL 840 F.2d 45,56 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
7
'/d at 53. 
"'W<:'inhe1ger, 765 F.2d at 939. 
17See genemllv Animal Legal Def Fund v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(tinding animal weltare group satisfied all standing requirements); Animal Welfare Inst. v. 
Kreps, 561 F.2d I 002 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (finding environmental group satisfied all standing 
requirements). The degree of evidence necessary to establish standing in cases involving 
animals is determined by the stage of trial. /,ujan, 504 U.S. at 561. In Lujan, the Court asserts 
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss1/7
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The U.S. Court of Appeals case Animal Lovers Volunteer Association, Inc. v. 
Weinberger7 ~ exemplifies the court system's unwillingness to find standing in cases 
involving animals. In this case, Animal Lovers Volunteer Association, Inc. 
("ALVA") sued to enjoin the U.S. Navy from continuing its "aerial eradication" 
program, which entailed shooting island-bound feral goats from helicopters. 79 
ALVA claimed that the program violated section 4332 of the National 
Environmental Policy Act. ~o However, the court refused to consider this argument 
atler finding ALVA had no standing to sue on this matter in a court of law. 
The court considered two areas where standing may be demonstrated and 
determined that ALVA did not satisfy either of the two. 81 First, ALVA did not allege 
an injury to any of its members. 82 Recognizing that courts do not find standing if an 
organization merely asserts an "interest in a problem, unaccompanied by allegations 
of actual injury to members of the organization," the court refused to grant standing 
to ALV A. 83 Additionally, because none of ALVA's members witnessed the goat-
shootings and therefore suffered no "direct sensory impact," the court refused to 
evidentiary requirements for the pleading, summary judgment, and final stages of trial. !d. As 
the case progresses, the level of proof that a plaintitT needs to show supporting the elements of 
standing increases, thus increasing the burden on those attempting to tile suit for the protection 
of animals. !d. 
78 Weinberger, 765 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1985). 
79/d. at 938. 
80/d. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2008), 
provides, in relevant part, that: 
Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: ( 1) the policies, 
regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered 
in accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter, and (2) all agencies of the 
Federal Government shall (A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which 
will insure the integrated usc of the natural and social sciences and the environmental 
design arts in planning and in decisionmaking which may have an impact on man's 
environment; (B) identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation with 
the Council on Environmental Quality established by subchapter I! of this chapter, 
which will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may 
be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along with economic and 
technical considerations; [and] (C) include in every recommendation or report on 
proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the 
quality of the human environment. 
42 U.S.C. ~ 4332. In addition: 
The purposes of [the Act! are: To declare a national policy which will encourage 
productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote 
etTorts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and 
stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological 
systems and natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on 
Environmental Quality. 
42 u.s.c. § 4321. 
81 Weinberger, 765 F.2d at 938-39. 
82 /d. at 938. 
83 /d. (citing California v. Watt, 683 F.2d 1253, 1270 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other 
grounds, 464 U.S. 312 ( 1984)). 
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distinguish their grievance from that of the general public's "generalized 
abhorrence" to "the prospect of cruelty to animals."84 Because generalized 
grievances are insufficient to establish standing and no individual injuries were 
alleged, the court affirmed the lower court's ruling that ALVA had no standing to 
sue on this matter. 85 
lntt>rnational Primatt> Protection League v. Institute for Behavioral Research, 
lnc.x" provides another example of the standing barrier. In that case, the International 
Primate Protection League, a non-profit organization specializing in protecting the 
well-being ofprimates, 87 and other corporations and individuals petitioned to prevent 
the return of abused primates to a research organization ("Institute") that used the 
animals for scientific research. After an individual animal rights activist witnessed 
multiple primates living in unsanitary conditions without adequate food, water, or 
veterinary care, the Institute and some of its employees were investigated. 88 During 
the investigation and subsequent trial for violations of state anti-cruelty laws,89 the 
National Institute of Health took temporary custody of the primates. 9° Fearing abuse 
would continue upon the return of the animals, the plaintiffs filed a complaint "in 
which the plaintiffs purported to speak for 'their own and class interests and as next 
friends of seventeen ( 17) non-human primates[.]"91 
84ld. at 938-39. 
85 /d. at 939. 
86Int'l Primate Prot. League v. Inst. 1or Behavioral Research, Inc., 799 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 
1986). 
87 According to the International Primate Protection League website: 
The International Primate Protection League ["IPPL"'] was founded in 1973, and, since 
this time. has been working continuously tor the well-being of primates. IPPL has 
Field Representatives in 3 I countries. Its Advisory Board is composed of experts from 
the fields of zoology, anthropology, medicine. biology, veterinary medicine, and 
psychology. Many IPPL officers have lived for long periods with primates in their 
natural habitats. 
International Primate Protection League, About Us, http://www.ippl.org/about.htmi (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2008). For more information about the International Primate Protection 
League. visit its home page at http://www.ippl.org. 
·~'The animal rights activist obtained employment from the Institute while enrolled as an 
undergraduate student. thereby granting him access to witness the inadequate treatment at the 
t:1cilitics tirst-hand. lnt '/ Primare Prot. League 799 F.2d at 936. 
'"A jury convicted the principal defendant in the criminal action, Dr. Edward Taub, of one 
count of cruelty to animals under Maryland's anti-cruelty statute. !d. at 935, 937. However, 
the Maryland Court of Appeals held that the statute did not apply to federally funded medical 
research programs and reversed the conviction. /d. at 937. See generally Taub v. State, 463 
A.2d RI9 (Md. 19R3) (reversing conviction of chief researcher upon finding that state anti-
cruelty law-; cannot be used to bring charges against researcher where research conducted 
under lederaliy funded program). 
'
10/nt '/Primate Prot. League, 799 F.2d at 936. 
'ill d. 
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Alleging violations of the Animal Welfare Act,"2 the plaintiffs sought designation 
by the court as guardians of the primates."3 The plaintifls presented two financial 
injuries in an attempt to satisfy the standing requirements. 94 First, the court 
dismissed the argument that the plaintiffs are entitled to sue to make certain federally 
funded organizations abide by the law by ''holding that payment of taxes does not 
purchase authority to enf()rce regulatory restrictions."'>' Second, the court 
determined that contributions made voluntarily by the plaintiffs to help care for the 
animals during the trial did "not establish ·a personal stake in the outcome of the 
controversy'" sufticient to establish standing.96 
Two non-financial injuries also proved insutticient to establish standing for the 
plaintiffs.n The plaintiffs argued that they had standing because they were: 
individuals and members having a personal interest in the preservation 
and encouragement of civilized and humane treatment of animals, whose 
own aesthetic, conservational, and environmental interests are specifically 
and particularly offended by the matters [in this case] and which interests, 
along with their educational interests, will be detrimentally impacted upon 
if the relief sought is not granted."x 
The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument, quoting the Supreme Court that '"a 
mere interest in a problem; no matter how longstanding the interest and no matter 
how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by 
itself' to create standing."99 Additionally, the court refused the plaintiffs' argument 
that language of the Animal Welfare Act provides individuals with a private cause of 
action. 100 Explaining that statutory construction provides the basis for whether such 
a right exists, the court ruled that "[t]o accord plaintiffs standing to sue by virtue of a 
private cause of action would not conform to the aims of Congress in the Animal 
Welfare Act." 1') 1 Finding the plaintiffs had no standing to sue, the court affirmed the 
lower court's granting of a motion to dismiss. 102 
Although a few courts have found standing to sue in cases where the true victim 
is an animal, such outcomes provide nothing more than false hopes for animal 
92 Animal Welfare Act of 1970, 7 U.S.C. ~~ 2131-2156 (2006). For a further discussion of 
the Animal Weltarc Act, see oupra Part V. 
93Jnt 'l Primate Prot. League, 799 F.2d at 936-37. 
94/d. at 937-38. 
95/d. 
96/d. at 938 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 ( 1962)). 
97/d. 
9Xfd 
""!d. 
100/d. at 940. 
101/d. 
102/d.at941. 
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activists. 103 Inconsistencies and a lack of reasoning based on precedent plague such 
decisions. 104 "'Courts simply declare some ... to have standing and others to lack 
standing, without so much as a passing nod to the established precedent governing 
standing determinations." 105 Thus, cases such as Ringling Brothers 106 do not open 
the courts up to protect animals, but merely "provid[e] a 'small window for standing' 
in certain, very limited situations." 107 
IV. JUDGES' USE OF THE STANDING BARRIER TO PROMOTE THEIR GOAL OF KEEPING 
CASES INVOLVING ANIMALS OUT OF THE COURTROOM 
Many animal advocates, both individuals and organizations, still have a great 
deal of ditliculty providing animals with their "day in court," due to many courts' 
highly strict construction of the standing requirements. 10x Courts often choose "to 
narrow standing, [to] narrow the rights of individuals to come into court bit by bit," 
using both constitutional and prudential arguments. 109 Stemming from the courts' 
desire to keep lawsuits involving animals out of the court system, this trend will 
continue, making the system even less accessible for animal advoeates. 110 
The main reason courts want to limit cases concerning the rights of animals in the 
court system is that such cases seem inconsequential when the system is already 
"overrun" with cases dealing strictly with human matters. 111 According to David 
Wolfson, 112 a fear exists that "to provide greater protection [to animals] would 
involve such a large number of lawsuits, cases brought before the courts ... would 
overburden a legal system that is already stretched to perhaps its capacity at this 
point." 113 It follows that the courts fear a massive influx of cases brought by animal 
activists if a more lenient approach is applied to the standing requirements. 
These concerns are unfounded. History has shown that when the law has granted 
wider protection where society necessitates, the courts have not been "'overrun" with 
ll
13See generally Ringling Bros., 317 F.3d 334 (holding a former circus elephant caretaker 
who witnessed the mistreatment of his charges had standing to sue); Glickman, 154 F.3d 426 
(holding regular visitors to primate exhibitions had standing when they repeatedly witnessed 
primates living in inhumane conditions). 
104DeCoux, supra note 15, at 6R2. 
105/d. 
106317 F.3d 334. See also Glickman, 154 F.3d 426 (holding regular visitors to primate 
exhibitions had standing when they repeatedly witnessed primates living in inhumane 
conditions). 
107 Francione, supra note 17. at 2X (emphasis added). 
10
xSee generallr cases cited supra note 37. 
109 Tize Legal S!a/us ol Nonhuman Animals, supra note 10, at 63 (quoting Professor 
Nicholas Robinson, Pace University School of Law). 
1111/d. 
111 /d. at 62. 
112Sullivan & w,)Ifson. supra note 22. 
113 The Legal Status of" Nonhuman Animals. supra note I 0. at 62. 
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unnecessary lawsuits. 114 The complexity of bringing a lawsuit, along with the large 
amount of resources required, has, and will continue, to protect the system from 
frivolous lawsuits because many are not willing to risk a loss should their challenge 
prove unsuccessful. This irrational fear is not a justifiable reason for the courts to 
continue stretching technicalities in a discretionarily abusive manner to keep animal 
activists out of the system. 
Another concern the courts may have regarding litigation involving animals is the 
necessity of using expert witnesses should such controversies proceed to trial. 
Plaintiffs in cases involving the mistreatment of animals must prove the animal or 
animals in question were subjected to physical or emotional pain, or that they were 
not provided adequate food, water, exercise, shelter, or healthcare. 115 Determinations 
of this kind often require knowledge of animal and veterinary sciences, which most 
judges and juries do not possess. 116 Thus, judges and juries require experts to help 
them "wad[ e] through the scientific principles involved" in reaching the correct 
outcome. 117 
Generally judges do not favor the use of expert witnesses by opposing parties in 
trials for a variety of reasons. 11 x First. respectable experts often refuse to participate 
in litigation because "they distrust[] the adversarial process to represent their views 
in an objective fashion or to expose the scientific truth." 119 Second, the practice of 
"shopping for experts" 120 by parties offers a high likelihood of biased testimony that 
will be given great weight by the jury. 121 Third, use of experts opens the court up to 
the possibility of "junk science," which is "a term developed to describe the type of 
expert testimony relied upon by some plaintiffs which is purported to lack credible 
114Good examples of such necessary granting of wider protection include the 
Environmental Movement of the 1970s, the Women's Rights Movement, the Civil Rights 
Movement, protection tor sexual harassment, and protection tor disabled persons. Jd. at 62, 
64. 
115See. e.g., Ringling Bros., 317 F.3d at 335 (finding in favor of a former elephant 
caretaker who witnessed abuse that had a negative impact on the animals' behavior); 
Glickman, 154 F.3d at 438, 444 (holding regular visitors to primate exhibitions had standing 
when they repeatedly witnessed primates living in inhumane conditions). 
116Jd. 
117Karen Butler Reisinger, Court-Appointed Expert Panels: A Comparison of Two Models, 
32 !ND.L.REV.225,226(1998). 
11 xSee generally id. (discussing the use of experts and expert panels in toxic tort litigation). 
119/d. at 232. 
120/d. "Shopping for experts is a partisan practice whereby parties select an expert based 
on the conformity of the expert's opinion to that party's theory of the case. This practice, 
according to commentators, helps obscure the truth rather than reveal it tor resolution by the 
jury." !d. Indeed, "[p]artisan experts ... often fail to clarify issues for the jury because the 
expert may tailor testimony to meet the needs of the client rather than make a full disclosure." 
Jd. at 234. 
121
"Thc great weight given to expert testimony introduced by a party when the issues in 
question are relatively precise has been frequently criticized." George J. Alexander, 
Premature Probate: A Different Perspective on Guardianship for the Elderly, 31 STAN. L. 
REV. 1003, 1017 (1979). 
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scientific foundation." 122 Finally, courts tend to shy away from the added cost of 
expert testimony, which greatly increases the overall cost of litigation. 123 This 
aversion to expert witnesses provides another motive for courts to refrain from 
allowing cases involving animals past the standing barrier. 
The current judicial system does not allow many cases involving animals to reach 
the courts, and this will not change in the near future. Although the fears held by the 
courts are not of significant concern, many judges feel that such concerns are 
legitimate. 124 Additionally, the existing older generation of judges does not embrace 
the concerns held by this country's younger generations regarding the necessity and 
moral duty to protect animals. 125 Before animal activists can hope for leniency from 
the courts in finding standing for cases involving animals, they will have to wait out 
several cycles of justices before the majority shares the growing concerns of the 
American people. Because the court system will not soon change its views regarding 
cases involving animals, animal activists must instead tum to legislation in order to 
provide adequate protection to animals. 
V. THE MANY PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT ANIMAL PROTECTION LAWS GENERATE A 
NEED FOR NEW LEGISLATION THAT PROVIDES MORE INCLUSIVE LANGUAGE AND 
IMPROVED ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 
The federal government has enacted a variety of legislation in an effort to protect 
specified animals. 126 The best known example 127 of such legislation is the Animal 
Welfare Act of 1970 ("A WA"). 128 The A W A provides recordkeeping, 
122Reisinger, supra note 117, at 232. 
123
"Expert testimony 'contributes substantially' to the high cost of litigation." David J. 
Damiani, Proposals for RefiJrm in the Evaluation of Expert Testimony in Pharmaceutical 
Mass Tort Cases, 13 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 517, 533 (2003). 
124 The Legal Status o{Nonhuman Animals, supra note l 0, at 62. 
125
"fO]ur legal system abhors change." Clayton Gillete & Joyce Tischler, Symposium 
Introduction, Con{ronting Barriers to the Courtroom jiJr Animal Advocates, 13 ANIMAL L. 13, 
19 (2006 ). 
126See Animal Welfare Act of 1970, 7 U.S.C. ~§ 2131-2156 (2008); Marine Mammal 
Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-142111 (2008); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 
U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (2008). 
127This Note should be read as an overview of deiieiencies in federal and state protective 
legislation in general. This author chooses to utilize the A WA (as welt as other legislation) 
throughout this Note to exemplify such deficiencies. This Note should not be read as a 
criticism of any Oth~ statute in particular. but rather as a criticism of animal protection statutes 
in general. 
1287 U.S.C. ~§ 2131-2156; Karen L. McDonald. Comment, Creating a Private Cause of 
Action Against Abusive Animal Research, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 399,402 (1986). According to 
Thomas G. Kelch: 
[t]he legislative history of the [AWA] states that small helpless creatures deserve the 
care and protection of a strong and enlightened public, and that the statute reflects a 
philosophy of caring lor animals. In addition, the history states that the legislation is 
an effort to demonstrate America's humanity toward lesser creatures and establish by 
law the humane ethic that animals should be accorded the basic creature comforts of 
adequate housing, ample food, reasonable handling, decent sanitation, sufficient 
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss1/7
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transportation, and general treatment regulations for animals used in laboratory 
research. 129 Primarily enforced by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, each 
laboratory is required to appoint an Institutional Animal Committee in charge of 
overseeing the treatment of animals used by that facility. 130 Such committees are 
made up of members chosen at the facility's discretion, merely requiring the 
inclusion of at least one veterinarian and one member not otherwise associated with 
that facility. 131 The committee is responsible for reporting violations to the 
Department of Agriculture, the Secretary of which may then conduct further 
investigations and impose penalties. 132 
State governments have also attempted to create statutory protection for animals 
through anti-cruelty statutes, 133 often with inadequate results. Generally, such 
statutes "provide the principal . . . legal protection to animals in America" by 
classifying animal cruelty as a criminal offense. 134 In an effort to stop the neglect, 
torture, and needless death of animals, such statutes provide for penalties including 
jail time, fines, counseling, community service, restitution, and seizure of the abused 
animal. 135 Although intended to protect animals from inhumane treatment, along 
with the federal animal protections statutes, various shortcomings within society and 
the statutes themselves allow for insufficient enforcement. 136 
ventilation, shelter from extremes of weather and temperature, and adequate veterinary 
care including appropriate use of pain-killing drugs. Similarly, the legislative history 
of the Animal Welfare Act Amendments of 1976 states as its purposes assuring of 
humane treatment of certain animals and increasing the protection afforded animals in 
transit. 
Kelch, supra note 15, at 542. 
129McDonald, supra note 128, at 403. 
130Int'l Primate Prot. League v. Ins!. for Behavioral Research, 799 F.2d 934, 939 n.4 
(1986) (citing 7 U.S.C. ~ 2143). 
131Id. 
132/d. (citing 7 U.S.C. ~§ 2134, 2146). Such penalties may include a cease and desist 
order, fines up to $1000 per violation per day, and removal of mistreated animals. !d. (citing 7 
U.S.C. §§ 2146(a), 2149(b)). However, animals are only removed where "the [suffering] 
animal 'is no longer required by the research facility to carry out the research, test or 
experiment for which such animal has been utilized."' !d. at 939 (quoting 7 U.S.C. ~ 2146(a)). 
133 SONIA S. WAISMAN ET AL., ANIMAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 472 (3d ed. 2006). 
134ld. While nine states (Alaska, Arkansas, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Mississippi, North 
Dakota, South Dakota, and Utah) maintain only misdemeanor anti-cruelty laws, forty-one 
states and the District of Columbia have established felony anti-cruelty laws. !d. at 4 72, note 
b. 
135!d. at472-73. 
136Those primarily responsible tor enforcement of the state anti-cruelty laws (police and 
prosecutors) often harbor resentment against having to enforce what they deem as trivial laws, 
and do not always receive adequate training. !d. at 475. In addition, community pressures and 
financial restraints may also hamper anti-cruelty law enforcement, as many citizens may 
consider the use of resources to provide tor animal care as a waste of tax dollars. !d. 
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A. Current Animal Protective Legislation Has Limited Applicability that Does Not 
Allowfor Adequate Protection ofA/1 Animals in Necessary Circumstances 
One general problem with many animal protection statutes is their limited 
application. At both the federal and state levels, these statutes significantly limit the 
type of animals deemed worthy of such protection. 137 For example, the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture explicitly excludes birds, rats, mice, horses (except when 
used for research), and other farm animals from the A W A. 13K Similarly, many state 
statutes exclude several varieties of fowl and are enforced only in situations 
involving dogs, cats, and horses. 139 Such pervasive exceptions and limitations render 
the statutes useless for the protection of numerous animals. 140 
Limited applicability problems also arise under the context of the type of 
activities regulated or prohibited under the statutes. Many protective statutes apply 
only in select circumstances. 141 The federal Marine Mammal Protection Act of 
1972, 142 for instance, allows for government mandated exceptions to its taking and 
importation prohibitions for scientific research, public displays, commercial fishing 
operations, photography, education, and commerce. 143 Additionally, many state anti-
cruelty statutes do not apply to treatment of farm animals during "customary farming 
practices." 144 According to Sullivan and Wolfson, "[a]lthough all fifty states 
137 See generally Animal Legal Dcf Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 
(holding animal welfare groups and individuals did not have standing to sue to expand the 
definition of"animals" to include birds, rats, and mice). "Most anti-cruelty laws ... [exclude] 
whole classes of animals, such as wildlife or farm animals." WAISMAN, supra note 133, at 
474. 
1389 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2008). The Department of Agriculture defines "animal" for purposes of 
the AWA as: 
!d. 
[A]ny live or dead dog, cat, nonhuman primate, guinea pig, hamster, rabbit, or any 
other warmblooded animal, which is being used, or is intended for usc for research, 
teaching, testing, experimentation, or exhibition purposes, or as a pet. This term 
excludes birds, rats of the genus Rattus, and mice of the genus Mus, bred for usc in 
research; horses not used for research purposes; and other farm animals, such as, but 
not limited to, livestock or poultry used or intended for use as food or fiber, or 
livestock or poultry used or intended tor use for improving animal nutrition, breeding. 
management, or production efficiency, or for improving the quality of food or fiber. 
139David J. Wolfson, Beyond the Law: Agribusiness and the Svstemic Abuse of Animals 
Raised for Food or Food Production, 2 ANIMAL L. 123, 131 ( 1996). 
140See id. See generally Taub v. State, 463 A.2d 819 (1983) (holding Maryland anti-
cruelty statute does not apply to animals used in federally funded scienti fie research). 
141 Most state anticruelty laws exclude "traditional veterinary practices; animals used for 
medical, educational or scientific research; hunting, fishing and trapping; animals and specific 
practices used in agricultural industries; pest control; animals and practices used in 
entertainment ... [and] animal training methods." WAISMAN, supra note 133, at 474. 
142 16 u.s.c. §§ 1361-142lh (2008). 
143/d. § 1371(a)(l). See Animal Welfare Inst. v. Kreps, 561 F.2d 1002, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 
1977); WAISMAN, supra note 133, at 654. 
144Sullivan & Wolfson, supra note 22, at 154-55. 
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currently have criminal laws ... prohibiting ... cruelty to animals, these laws have 
not ... limited in any way even the cruelest farming practices. A majority of states 
simply exclude 'customary' farming practices from legal restriction.'' 145 
The A W A provides another example of applicability problems. The goal of the 
A W A is to "ensure that animals intended for use in research facilities are provided 
humane care and treatment." 146 However, "[t]he A W A explicitly asserts that 
'[n]othing in this Act ... shall be construed as authorizing the Secretary [of 
Agriculture] to promulgate rules, regulations, or orders with regard to design, 
outlines, guidelines, or performance of actual research or experimentation by a 
research facility."' 147 In essence, regulation under the A WA only allows for 
protection before and after experiments; animals are virtually defenseless during the 
most critical phase. 14R Viewed by many as deficient, this 1pproach is sometimes 
described as allowing regulators to "peer through the window of the laboratory door, 
[while] the scientist still holds the key to the lock.'MJ 
Such limiting exceptions do not belong in effective animal protection statutes. 
The majority of animals excluded from particular statutes are precisely those 
requiring the most protection regarding the regulated activity. For instance, the 
Humane Methods of Slaughter Act of 1958, 150 which "requires that livestock 
slaughter 'be carried out only by humane methods' to prevent 'needless suffering,'" 
excludes chickens from protection. 151 Because approximately seven billion broiler 
chickens are slaughtered each year in the United States, this statute provides 
insufficient protection for all affected animals. 15c Comparable discrepancies plague 
many of the animal protection statutes currently in operation, necessitating more 
inclusive legislation to provide for realization of their intended purposes. 151 
Similarly, those activities which are excluded from certain regulatory statutes 
generally take place where the affected animals are in the most danger of suffering 
inhumane treatment. "Customary" farm practices, exempt from most state anti-
cruelty statutes, often consist of unimaginably cruel practices. 154 Many such 
practices include castration and tail removal of pigs without anesthetic, housing of 
146McDonald, supra note 128, at 404 (citing 7 U .S.C. ~ 2131 ). 
147JORDAN CURNUTT, ANIMALS AND TilE LAW: A SOURCEBOOK 471 (200 I). 
14X/d. 
149/d. 
1507 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1906. 
151 Wolfson, supra note 139, at 126. 
152Jd. at 131. 
153 For instance, the purpose of the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act of 195H is to prevent 
the "needless sufTcring" of livestock and "that the slaughtering of livestock and the handling 
of livestock in connection with slaughter shall be carried out only by humane methods." 7 
U.S.C. ~ 1901 (2006). The stated purpose ofthe AWA is to ensure the humane treatment and 
transport of animals used in research, used for exhibition, or kept as pets. 7 U.S. C. ~ 2131 
(2006). 
154Wolfson, supra note 139, at 133-34. 
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sows in gestation crates. 1; 5 abuse of ··downed" and young cattle, providing 
inadequate nourishment and living space to veal calves, 15 " and various abuses of 
poultry. 157 Similarly, research studies exempted from A W A regulation often include 
extremely cruel and painful inflictions of injuries on defenseless animals, such as 
severing nerves in primates' limbs to study the ellects of strokes 15s or intentionally 
causing head injuries. 15Y In allowing such broad exemptions under the language of 
the statute, a great deal of destructive behavior is allowed to slip through unimpeded 
by regulation, much to the detriment of the ''protected'' animals. 1"'J 
Limited applicability problems can be remedied by giving greater control to 
enforcement agencies through statutory provisions. Using the A W A again as an 
example, current law does not allow the government to have any regulation power 
155 fd. at 134 ("[P]igs are castrated and have their tails removed without anesthetic. 
Moreover, gestating (pregnant) sows and farrowing (birthing) sows are housed in stalls where 
they are unable to tum around. Such intensive farming practices result in health problems, 
including lameness or high death rates, which are aggravated by uncontrolled genetic selection 
for production traits such as rapid growth. Genetic problems are increasing; some pigs are so 
excitable that quiet humane handling at the slaughter plant is very difficult."). 
15r'Jd. ("Agribusiness subjects cattle of all ages to inhumane practices. For example, day-
old baby calves are transported from the dairy farm before they are able to walk, resulting in 
calves being thrown, dragged, or trampled. This practice is becoming increasingly accepted at 
dairies in some parts of the country. Furthermore, cattle farmers often drag downed, crippled 
cows and will sell cows for slaughter when they are physically unfit to travel. Some 
communities consider this an accepted practice, but most good producers condemn the abuse 
of downers. Most downer cows are emaciated or in poor physical condition before they leave 
the farm. Veal calves are housed in stalls where they are unable to turn around. The calves 
are fed a liquid diet that does not allow the normal function of the calfs rumen. In addition, 
cattle arc dehorned, castrated and hot-iron branded without anesthetic."). 
157 !d. ("Poultry are also victims of cruel husbandry practices, such as the removal of 
chicken's beaks. Additionally. the starvation of laying hens to make them enter the next 
laying cycle is a common prac:tice. This is termed ·torced moulting.' Egg layers are housed 
without access to a nest box in a manner that does not allow the birds a full range of motion. 
Another common practice is the disposal of male chicks or live unhatched eggs by suiTocation. 
Agribusiness does not restrict its cruel practices to chickens. For example, geese are force-fed 
tix thefhic gras trade by pump-feeding f(lod down the birds' throats."). 
15 ~1nt'l Primate Prot. League v. lnst. for Behavioral Research, Inc .. 799 F.2d 934. 936 (4th 
Cir. 1986) ("Taub, the chief of the Behavioral Biology Center of the Institute of Behavioral 
Research (IBR), was studying the capacity of monkeys to learn to use a limb a tier nerves had 
been severed. Funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH). the project amplified Taub's 
earlier research in this area and attempted to discover benefits for the rehabilitation of human 
patients suffering trom a serious neurological injury such as a stroke."). 
159McDonald, ,\Upra note 128, at 404 ("In head injury tests at the University of 
Pennsylvania, precise amounts of pressure were applied to monkeys' heads with a pneumatic 
hammer-like mechanism. Helmets that had been placed on the monkeys' heads were then 
removed by the researchers with hammers and chisels, thus raising serious doubts about the 
validity of the researchers' tlndings as well as concems about the level of pain to which the 
monkeys were subjected."). 
1
"
0See generally id. (demonstrating a variety of abuse suffered by animals at the hands of 
scientific researchers). 
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over the research experiment itself. 161 Animals, therefore, are left to the mercy of the 
scientists, who often heed no concern to the well-being of their subjects. 162 Reform 
to animal protection statutes can give limited discretion to those regulated to conduct 
their business as they choose while enabling the government to intercede should such 
conduct overstep the bounds of humanity. This can be accomplished by new 
legislation providing sufficiently broad oversight to enforcement agencies to provide 
the intended protection to all animals covered by the regulations. Applying such 
standards to all protective animal legislation will afford some much-needed 
protection to those animals at risk while still allowing enough discretion for 
scientists and others subject to regulation to carry on "business as usual" with 
minimal interference. 
B. Peer Enforcement of Protective Animal Regulations Shield lndustril:'s Using 
Animals from Objective Enforcement, Allowing Such Industries to Disregard Such 
Regulations 
Animal protection regulations are primarily enforced by administrative agencies 
through the use of oversight committees. 163 Such systems of implementation do not 
lead to adequate enforcement largely due to the makeup of such committees, which 
consist primarily of others involved in that area of regulated conduct. 164 This system, 
known as "peer review," allows a great deal of opportunity for disregard of such 
regulations. 165 
Peer review is an ineffective means of carrying out animal protection statutes. 
The assumption that fellow overseers will satisfactorily perform their review allows 
frequent opportunity for abuses to be overlooked. In Taub v. State 166 an animal care 
committee "assumed that the treatment of the [animals in a research facility] were 
satisfactory simply because the laboratory had been inspected by the Department of 
161 CURNUTT, supra note 147, at 471. 
162Many scientists do not regard the treatment of their research subjects as important. 
Their only concern is the outcome of such experiments. McDonald, supra note 12 R, at 404. 
163For example, the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §~ 1361-142\h 
(2006), and the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S. C. ~§ \53 I -1543 (2006 ), arc 
administered by the Department of Commerce ''through the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration and the [National Marine Fisheries Servicej . . . and the 
Department of the Interior, through the [U.S.] Fish and Wildlite Service.'' WA!S\1AN. SllfJra 
note 133, at 620, 653 (citing \6 U .S.C. §§ 1362( II), 1533(a) (2006) ). The Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service is in charge of managing the Animal Welfare Act of 1970 7 U .S.C. 
§§ 2131-2156 (2006). United States Department of Agriculture, AhcJl/1 APHIS, 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/about~aphis/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2008). See Robert .1. Masonis, 
Comment, The Improved Standards for Lahora/OI}' Animals Act and the Proposed 
Regulations: A Glimmer of Hope in the Battle Against Almsin: Animal Research. 16 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 149, 176-78 ( \988). For enforcement of state anti-cruelty laws, see 
WAISMAN, supra note \33. 
164McDona1d, supra note 128, at 402-08. 
165ld. 
166463 A.2d 819 (Md. 1983). 
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Agriculture and the project was funded by the [National Institutes of Health]." 1(' 7 
Additionally, as fellow participators in a particular trade, committee members are 
likely to defer to decisions of those they are inspecting, and may not find fault in 
inhumane customs. Thus, peer review provides nothing more than a one-sided check 
on regulated organizations and activities, providing little to no benefit for the animals 
those regulations were created to protect. 16x 
While new administrative agencies should be granted power over implementation 
of protective legislation, committees within the administrative agencies should 
remain primarily responsible for oversight of the treatment of animals. However, the 
composition of such committees is in need of restructuring. Many of these 
committees are made up of scientists or tradesmen and those with something to lose 
should the laboratory or business come under legal scrutiny. 164 "In Sweden a 
scientist must receive the approval of an oversight committee consisting of a 
scientist, a technician, and a layperson before beginning an experiment on 
animals." 170 Animal protection statutes should be reformed to create similar 
requirements for all oversight committees responsible for ensuring the humane 
treatment of animals. The addition of multiple laypersons would provide a 
viewpoint more in accordance with society as a whole as to what constitutes 
inhumane treatment, rather than merely that of the scientific or other business 
community. Animals could count on these unbiased committee members to object 
when otherwise traditional trade practices prove cruel and unnecessary. 
1
"
7McDonald, supra note !2S. at 406 (citing The Use ofAnimals in Medical Research and 
Testing: Hearing Before the Suhcomm. on Science, Research and Technology of the H. Comm. 
on Science and Technologv, 97th Con g. 43 ( 19X I) (statement of Alex Pacheco, Chairperson, 
People for Ethical Treatment of Animals)). 
16
xFor example, the United States General Accounting Otlice concluded: 
Incomplete and inconsistent inspection records made it difficult to determine the 
frequency and scope of humane handling and slaughter violations. [The Food Safety 
and Inspection Service] was unable to produce at least 44 of its inspection records that 
document violations of the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (HMSA) and 
implementing regulations. Also, inspectors did not always document violations of the 
HMSA ... [and] the records that FSlS provided did not consistently document the 
scope and severity of each incident. 
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL ReQUESTERS: HUMANE METHODS 
OF SLAUGHTER AcT: USDA HAS ADDRESSED SOME PROHLEMS BUT STILL FACES ENFORCEMENT 
CHALLENGES 1 (2004). 
164Masonis, supra note 163, at 177. 
170McDonald, supra note 128, at 432 n.62 (citing Karl Johan Obrink, Swedish Law on 
Laboratory Animals, in SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES ON ANIMAl. WELFARE 56-58 (\V. Jean Dodds 
& F. Barbara Orlans eds., 1982)). "If the proposed experiment does not adequately account 
lor the animals' interests, the committee works with the scientist to develop an alternate 
experimental method. Further. the local health authorities receive reports on each 
experiment." ld. 
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C. Delegation of'Enforcement Responsibilitl' to Sel'eral 5'eparate Departments and 
Agencies Provides Inadequate EnjiJrcemcnt and Must Be Allocated to One Primary 
Department 
While the A W A and other animal protection statutes were created with good 
intentions, the current mode of enforcement through a multitude of separate agencies 
has led to a disjointed and inefficient effort. For instance, at the federal level, the 
Humane Methods of Slaughter Act and the A W A are enforced by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture 171 while the Marine Mammal Protection Act is enforced 
by the U.S. Department of Commerce through the National Marine Fisheries 
Service. 172 Additionally, enforcement of the Endangered Species Act is "split 
between the [Department] of the Interior ... and the [Department] of Commerce." 171 
State enforcement is also divided among departments, such as in New Jersey where 
oversight of the "health and well-being" of livestock is executed by the New Jersey 
Department of Agriculture, 174 while animal control, animal facility inspection, and 
veterinary supervision are all managed through the New Jersey Department of Health 
and Senior Services. 175 
Due to these broad distributions of responsibility, much opportunity exists for 
careless and disorganized "enforcement" of animal protection statutes. 17(' Because of 
171 Humane Methods of Slaughter Act of 195X. 7 U.S.C. ~~ 1901-1906 (2006); Animal 
Welfare Act of 1970,7 U.S.C. ~~ 2131-2156 (2006). 
17250 C.F.R. § 216.8 (2008). 
173WAISMAN, supra note 133. at 620. Under the Department of the Interior, the U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service is responsible for ''listing species and designating their critical habitat" 
for all threatened and endangered species, "except those species over which thl' Senetary of 
Commerce was granted jurisdiction by an executive reorganization in 1970. Comml.'rcc 
oversees most marine species, including anadromous fish (!ish that migrate lrom lreshwatcr to 
saltwater), but excepting marine birds and sea otters." Id This responsibility is delegated 
from the Secretary of Commerce to the National Marine fisheries Service. !d. 
174State of NL"w Jersey Department of Agriculture, Ahout the Division, 
http://www.state.nj.us/agriculture/divisions/ah/about/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2008). 
!d. 
The Division of Animal Health [under the Department of Agriculture] maintains 
disease control programs to protect the health and well being of livestock in New 
Jersey. The division tracks int(mnation about emerging disL"ases around the world that 
may impact the Garden State, conducts epidemiological investigations of livestock 
diseases and dmg residues, opl.'rates an animal health diagnostic laboratory. manages a 
contagious equine metritis quarantine facility in Long Valley t(Jr imported horses and 
supports an aggressive Johnc 's disease control program. 
175State of New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services, Office of' Animal 
Welf'are, http://www.statc.nj.us/hcalth/animalwelfarc/indcx.shtml (last visited Oct. 31. 2008). 
Under the Department of Health and Senior services: 
!d. 
The Office of Animal Weltare is dedicated to promoting and protecting the hL"alth, 
safety and welfare of companion animals in the state of New Jersey. The Office of 
Animal Welfare works to promote responsible pet care and to ensure that pets do not 
suffer due to abuse, neglect or lack of proper care. 
176Sce McDonald, supra note 128. al 406 (citing The Usc of' Animals in A1edica/ Research 
and Testing: Hearing Before the Suhcomm. on Science. Research and Teclmolo:.,~· olthc H. 
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this, the protection of animals requires new legislation that creates individualized 
agencies to enforce both existing and new animal protections statutes, under the 
direction of one specific department. 177 This will alleviate problems of 
miscommunication between the agencies, as well as deluded reliance on other 
agencies' findings. 178 
The USDA's enforcement of the A WA provides a clear example of why an 
increase in oversight and power for regulatory agencies is not adequate and 
enforcement must be regulated under one primary department (specifically the U.S. 
Department of the Interior, at the federal level, and the Department of Natural 
Resources, or its equivalent, in each state). The main problem with the A W A does 
not lie solely with the USDA's lack of power to regulate use of animals in 
agriculture and science, but also its lack of willingness to enforce regulations. 17Y 
"Congress, concerned with the [A W A's] poor enforcement, has often had to foist 
Comm. on Science and Technology, 97th Cong. 43 ( 1981) (statement of Alex Pacheco, 
Chairperson, People for Ethical Treatment of Animals)). 
177This system can be modeled atler the Victoria. Australia Bureau of Animal Welfare. In 
Victoria: 
[t]he Bureau of Animal Welfare is located in the Biosecurity Victoria branch of the 
Department of Primary Industries. It was formed to be the focal point for liaison, co-
ordination and co-operation in animal welfare matters between the states, 
Commonwealth governments, local government and animal welfare agencies in 
Victoria. The functions of the Bureau are to: (p]rovide administrative and technical 
support to the Victorian Animal Welfare Advisory Committee (A WAC), Domestic 
Animals Management Implementation Committee (DAMIC), Wildlife and Small 
Consultancies Animal Ethics Committee. Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Inspectors 
Group, Animal Ethics Committee Advisory Committee and the Responsible Pet 
Ownership Education Advisory Committee[; rjesolve issues raised by animal wei fare 
agencies and organisations responsible for animal welfare and management[; 
f]acilitate the operation of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1986, Prevention 
of Cruelty to Animals Regulations 1997, Domestic (Feral and Nuisance) Animals Act 
1994, Domestic (Feral and Nuisance) Animals Regulations 2005, Impounding 
Livestock Act 1994 and Impounding Livestock Regulations 2008[; r]eview and 
develop codes of practice, guidelines and standards tor the protection and promotion 
of good welfare for all animals[; p]rovide advice to Municipalities to facilitate their 
implementation of the Domestic (Feral and Nuisance) Animals Act 1994, the 
Domestic (Feral & Nuisance) Animals Regulations 1996 and the Impounding 
Livestock Act 1994(; rjegulate the use of animals in research and teaching[; p]rovide 
representation on the Primary Industry Standing Committee's Animal Wcltare 
Committee to liaise with animal welfare representatives fTom Australian and New 
Zealand governments, the CSIRO. and Animal Health Australia[; and m]onitor animal 
welfare developments in other states/territories, countries. research organisations and 
welfare organisations. 
Depa11ment of Primary Industries, Agriculture, Food & Forestry: Animal Welji:rre, 
http://www.dpi.vic.gov.au/dpi/nrenfa.nsf (follow "Animals & Livestock'' hyperlink; then 
follow "Animal Welfare" hypcrlink) (last visited Oct. 31, 2008). 
17
xMcDonald, supra note 128, at 406 (citing The Use o/"Animals in Medical Research and 
Testing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 011 Science, Research and Technology of the H. Comm. 
011 Science and Technology, 97th Cong. 43 ( 1981) (statement of Alex Pacheco, Chairperson, 
People for Ethical Treatment of Animals)). 
17~Sullivan & Wolfson, supra note 22, at 166-o7. 
24https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss1/7
2009) NO CRACKS IN THE WALL 161 
more money upon the [USDA] than requested. demonstrating what appears to be the 
USDA's fundamental disinterest in the task." 1 ~11 However, the USDA still maintains 
only 110 inspectors to oversee over 10,000 licensed faci1ities. 181 The USDA's 
obvious apathetic attitude toward enforcement of the A W A necessitates the transfer 
of control to new agencies made up of people without ties to the "business" of 
animal exploitation. 
The USDA as the primary enforcer of the A W A, is not likely to strictly 
implement many of the regulations provided for in the federal statute. 18" The USDA 
is "entrusted primarily with promoting agriculture, not just regulating it. Moreover, 
the promotion of agriculture has increasingly meant the promotion of corporate 
agribusiness." 183 The economic priority of the USDA is further evidenced by a 2008 
USDA News Release, which quotes Agricultural Secretary Mike Johanns as saying: 
[President Bush's] agricultural budget provides important resources that 
are necessary to promote economic opportunities and to preserve our 
commitment to our farmers, ranchers, rural citizens, and families in need. 
This budget aims to enhance our country's vibrant ag[riculture] economy, 
advance renewable energy, protect America's food supply, tmprove 
nutrition and health, and conserve our natural resources. 184 
The news release, which does not mention animal welfare even in passing, 
commends the budget as meeting '"the Department's most important priorities." 185 
As such. the department has been in a sense "captured" by the agricultural industry's 
economic motive, leading to lenient enforcement of A W A regulations. 186 
This "capture" of the USDA by the agricultural business industry is further 
demonstrated by the makeup of much of the USDA personnel. Many employed by 
the USDA have current or recent ties with many of the organizations the A W A is 
180/d. at 167. 
181/d. 
182Kelch, supra note 15, at 543. 
183Sullivan & Wolfson, supra note 22, at 159. 
184Press Release. USDA, News Release No. 0024.07 (Feb. 5, 2007). 
\85fd. 
186Kelch, supra note 15, at 543. One author writes: 
Unfortunately, the USDA has a cont1ict of interest and their ties to big agribusiness 
win out against the suffering of animals who are considered to be mere property in the 
American legal system. This con11ict stems from the tact that the USDA must 
"promote and police American agriculture." Lately, the USDA has focused more on 
this promotion due to "'the beef industry's large donations to the Republican Party, and 
its political appointees." However. both political parties are vulnerable to the financial 
lobbying of the meat industry. 
Robyn Mallon. The Deplorable Standard ol Living Faced hy Farmed Animals in America ·s 
.i'vfeat Industrv and Huw tu Imprm·e Condi!ions hy Eliminating !he Corporate Farm. 9 Mll'H 
Sr. U. J. Mm. & L. 3R9, 412 (2005). 
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meant to regulate, as well as to economic and business oriented groups.m Three 
examples include the Deputy Secretary of Agriculture Chuck Conner, Deputy Under 
Secretary for Farm and Foreign Agricultural Services Floyd D. Gaibler, and the 
Deputy Under Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs J. Burton Eller, 
Jr. 1xx Mr. Conner has a degree in Agricultural Economics and, prior to his current 
position, was president of the Corn Refiners Association IX'! and served on the 
National Economic Council. 190 Mr. Gaibler also holds a degree in Agricultural 
Economics and is the former vice president of the Agricultural Retailers Association 
and the International Dairy Foods Association, and former executive director of the 
National Cheese Institute/ American Butter lnstitute. 191 Mr. Eller's credentials boast 
"a variety of executive posts with the National Cattlemen's Association, including 
Executive Vice President and Chief Operating 0Hicer." 192 Such associations, 
especially with the National Cattlemen's Association, exemplify the USDA's strong 
attachment to the economic and "big business" aspects of agriculture that lead to its 
lenient enforcement of A W A regulations. 193 
The interests of animals would be better served by granting sole enforcement 
responsibility of protective animal legislation to the U.S. Department of the Interior 
for a variety of reasons. 194 First, this Department is already responsible for 
enforcement of some animal related statutes: assigning responsibility for all such 
statutes to one department allows tor less opportunity for miscommunication and 
1
x
7 See generallv USDA, USDA Biographies, http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/ 
_ s. 7 _ 0 _ A/7 _0_1 OB'1contentidonly=true&contentid=usda _ bios.xml (last visited Oct. 31, 
2008). 
JS'
1The Corn Refiner's Association is "a national trade association representing the corn 
refining industry." USDA, USDA Biographies, Acting Secretary ol Agriculture Chuck 
Conwr. http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/'ut/p/ _s. 7 _0 _AI 7 _ 0 _I OB">contentidonly=true&cont 
entidc,bios _conncr_new.xrnl (last visited Oct. 31, 2008 ). 
1911/d. 
1
'
11 USDA. USDA Biographies, F/onl D. Gaih/er Deputy Under Secretary for Farm and 
Foreign Agriculnrral Sen•ices. http:/ /www.usda.gov/wps/portal/1 ut/p/ _ s. 7 _ 0_ AI 7 _ 0 _I 08? 
contentidonly~true&contentid~bios_gaibler.xml (last visited Oct. 31. 2008). 
1
'
12USDA, USDA Biographies. J. Burton Eller . .Jr. Deputv Under SecretarvfrJ/· Marketing 
ond Regulatorv Programs http://www.uscla.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/ _s. 7 0 N7 0 I OB'l 
contcnltdonly-'true& content id=bios_eller.xml (last visited Oct. 31, 2008). 
1
"
3The National Cattlemen· s Beef Association "work[ s] to increase profit opportunities for 
cattle and beef producers by enhancing the business climate and building consumer demand." 
National Cattlemen's Beef Association, http://www.beeli.tsa.org (last visited Oct. 31, 2008). 
194 lmplementation of such federal legislation is justified under the Commerce Power of the 
federal government. The U.S. Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power "'(t]o 
regulate Commerce with t<->reig:n Nations, and among the seFeral States, and with the Indian 
Tribes." U.S. CoNST. art. I, ~ 8. cl. 3 (emphasis added). Accordingly, any use of animals 
transported across stale lines, including for agriculture. entertainment, or scientific research. 
may be regulated by the federal government. 
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better allocation of resources. 195 Next, unlike the Department of Agriculture, the 
Department of the Interior has a mission to protect resources, rather than determine 
the best way to utilize them tor greatest economic benefit. 1% Thus, the Department of 
the Interior would not have any conflicts of interest in enforcing regulations that 
protect animals used in economic enterprises. Additionally, the general personnel 
makeup of the Department does not include those with ties to agribusiness or other 
groups that may have goals detrimental to animal interests. 147 This alleviates some 
concerns of ulterior motives or outside influence leading to lenient and insufficient 
entorcement. 1n 
The five goals proclaimed by the Department of the Interior provide further 
evidence that enforcement of animal use regulations should be their responsibility. 
First, the Department seeks to "[p]rotect the Nation's [n]atural, [c]ultural, and 
[h]eritage [r]esources." 190 As such, protection of animals fits neatly into the overall 
departmental scheme. Second, the Department strives to "[m]anage [r]esources to 
[p]romote [r]esponsible [u]se and [s]ustain a [d]ynamic [e]conomy."200 This goal 
covers the use of animals in many different economic enterprises, including 
agriculture, entertainment, and scientific research. Third, the Department's goal to 
"[p]rovide recreation opportunities for America" must include regulation of animal 
use tor entertainment purposes. including such activities as public animal showcases 
and horseback riding in national parks. 201 The Department's fourth goal of serving 
communities by "[s]afeguard[ing] lives, property and assets, advanc[ing] scientific 
knowledge, and improv[ing] the quality of life tor communities we serve" plays 
directly into the use of animals in scientific research. 202 More important, however, is 
the clear connection between this goal and the role that protective regulation plays in 
bettering society as a whole due to the connection between animal abuse and 
violence towards other people?n Finally, the goal to "[m]anage the Department to 
be highly skilled, accountable, modern, functionally integrated, citizen-centered and 
result-oriented" would provide the tools necessary for the efficient enforcement of 
195The United States Department of the Interior is partially responsible for enforcement of 
the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2008). See WAISMAN, supra 
note 173. 
196The mission of the Department of the Interior is to "protect and provide access to our 
Nation "s natural and cultural heritage and honor our trust responsibilities to Indian Tribes and 
our commitments to island communities" (emphasis added). U.S. Department ofthe Interior, 
DO/ Mission, http://www.doi.gov/secretary/mission.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2008). 
197 Sec generally U.S. Department of the Interior, DO/ Key Officials, http://www.doi.gov/ 
secretary/ofticials.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2008). 
198Kelch, supra note 15. at 543. 
199See U.S. Department ofthe Interior, supra note 196. 
200/d. 
20\Jd. 
202/d. 
203See generallv sources cited supra note 19. 
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animal protection laws.204 Thus, the goals already in place by the Department of the 
Interior provide an ideal structure for the enforcement of animal protection laws. 
In accordance with the above suggestions for enforcement of federal legislation, 
enforcement of state animal regulatory laws would be best conducted by each state's 
Departmem of Natural Resources (or equivalent department). The structures and 
missions of these departments closely resemble that of the U.S. Department of the 
Interior. 205 For instance, the Ohio Department of Natural Resources was created to 
"[put] into execution a long term comprehensive plan and program for the 
development and wise use of the natural resources of the state, to the end that the 
health, happiness and wholesome enjoyment of life of the people of Ohio may be 
further encouraged."206 In carrying out this "plan and program," the Department 
enforces laws regulating resource management, economic development, recreation, 
and health and safety. Just as the similarly organized U.S. Department of the Interior 
is best suited to enforce protective animal legislation, thus are the comparable state 
Departments of Natural Resources. 
VI. SUGGESTED LEGISLATIVE MODEL 
The following suggested legislative model will help lawmakers in drafting more 
inclusive and efficient legislation for the protection of animals. In accepting all of 
the provisions of this model, federal legislators will ensure their goal of protecting 
"helpless creatures."207 Lawmakers at the state level may also utilize the model by 
implementing the definitions, regulations, and oversight methods into their state's 
current anti-cruelty laws or in creation of new laws. Using the model as a guideline 
in drafting legislation will help alleviate many of the problems of enforcement and 
exclusion that currently exist in animal protection statutes. 
204See U.S. O<;:partmcnt of the Interior, supra note 196. 
20 ;Sec gcneral(v Maryland Department of Natural Resources, Our Mission: Maryland 
Di:'pf. of Natural Resources, http://www.dnr.state.md.us/mission.asp (last visited Oct. 31, 
20Wi) ("The Department of Natural Resources preserves, protects, enhances and restores 
Maryland's natural resources for the wise usc and enjoyment of all citizens."); Washington 
State Department of Natural Resources, Welcome to Washington DNR, 
http://www.dnr.wa.gov/ AboutDNR/Pages/Home.aspx (last visited Oct. 31, 2008) (stating a 
mission "[t]o provide professional, forward-looking stewardship of our state lands, natural 
resources, and environment ... [and] [t]o provide leadership in creating a sustainable future 
for the Trusts and all citizens."); Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, DNR Mission 
Statemem, http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/aboutdnr/missionstatement.html (last visited Nov. 16, 
2008) (stating a mission "[t]o protect and enhance our natural resources: our air, land and 
water: our wildlite, fish and forests and the ecosystems that sustain all life. To provide a 
healthy, su~tainable environment and a full range of outdoor opportunities. To ensure the right 
of all people to usc and enjoy these resources in their work and leisure. To work with people 
to understand each other's views and to carry out the public will. And in this partnership 
consider the future and generations to follow.''). 
20
''0hio Department of Natural Resources, http://www.dnr.state.oh.us/aboutus/tabid/ 
I 0748/Default.aspx, (last visited Nov. 3. 2008). The Ohio Department of Natural Resources 
states as its mission: "To ensure a balance between wise use and protection of our natural 
resources for the bcnetit of all." ld 
'');Kelch, supm note 15, at 542. 
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(I) No person. institution. or corporation may subject an animal to unnecessarily 
painful, cruel, or inhumane treatment. 
(A) "Animal" includes all creatures, including domestic. teral, and wild, 
that are neither humans nor plants, whether warm-blooded or cold-blooded, 
including. but not limited to, non-human mammals, reptiles. birds, amphibians, fish, 
and all sentient beings. This detinition shall be narrowed only in those situations 
where a broad definition will produce absurd or impossible results. This definition 
shall not be read to include viruses, bacteria. unicellular organisms. or other 
microorganisms. This definition shall be read to include those animals created 
through genetic manipulation, in accordance with this section. 
(B) Inhumane treatment includes, but is not limited to, (I) treatment that 
causes unnecessary or intense pain. (2) extended deprivation of basic necessities. 
including, but not limited to, food, water, companionship, adequate shelter, medical 
treatment, and exercise, (3) treatment that causes psychological and emotional 
instability, and (4) treatment that leads to unnecessary or painful death. 
(C) "Unnecessary pain" is defined as pain that is not absolutely necessary in 
the course of treatment to ensure a benefit to the animal itself Intense pain that does 
not produce a benefit for the animal itself~ but merely provides a benefit to those 
utilizing the animal for economic or intellectual gain, constitutes unnecessary pain 
and is prohibited under this statute. Unnecessary pain shall not be read as limited by 
the definition of intense pain. 
(D) "Intense pain" is defined as pain exceeding the limits of humanity, 
either directly resulting from method of infliction or indirectly caused thereby, 
resulting in such physical or mental suffering as to amount to cruelty or torture. 
(II) "Person, institution, or corporation" includes. but is not limited to, any 
individual, commercial and non-commercial establishments, schools, laboratories, 
research centers, medical centers, military organizations, farms, parks, circuses and 
other amusement establishments, zoos, and fisheries. 
(III) This statute hereby establishes a Division of Animal Welfare, created under 
the United States Department of the Interior, to be established no less than nine 
months after passage of this statute. 
(A) The Division of Animal Welfare will oversee the enforcement of this 
statute to ensure the humane treatment of animals. 
(B) The Division of Animal Welfare may create lower agencies to help 
with enforcement of this statute, all of which will report to the Division of Animal 
Welfare. 
(C) The Division of Animal Welfare and its lower agencies will have 
supreme authority over the treatment of animals, subject only to the oversight of the 
Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior; a person, institution, or 
corporation subject to this statute may submit reports explaining their use of animals 
prior to a tina! determination. Nothing in this section shall be construed to allow 
leniency when determining whether treatment is crud, inhumane, or unnecessary due 
to the motivation of the use of the animal. 
(D) Individual oversight committees shall be responsible for initial 
investigation of each person, institution, and corporation. These committees shall be 
established by the Division of Animal Welfare or any of its designated lower 
agencies. Each .:ommittee shall consist of no less than a ten percent makeup of 
laypersons unaftil iated with the person. institution, or corporation under 
investigation, no less than two veterinarians. and no less than a seventy percent 
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makeup of persons unatliliated with the person, institution, or corporation under 
investigation. 
(I) Veterinarians participating on oversight committees must be current] y 
licensed by a state veterinary medical licensing board registered under the American 
Association of Veterinary State Boards. The veterinarian must currently be in good 
standing under the state veterinary licensing board from which his or her license was 
granted. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
American society's perception of animals has come a long way since the country 
was founded over 200 years ago. However, the court system has been slow to evolve 
along with these views, and the standing requirement maintains a barrier tor those 
wishing to enforce protection through litigation. While protective legislation 
currently exists, it does not provide the necessary means of enforcement to 
accomplish its objectives. Thus, the enactment of new legislation is necessary to 
ensure animals in this country exist under decent and humane conditions. 
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